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INSIGHTS INTO THE PROCESS OF 
CONVERGING INTER-AGENCY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
Roberta Banaszak Gleiter 
The Aerospa« Corporation, Los Angeles, CA 
Captain Lee Rosen 
Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, CA 
Tht opi11ions ud condusions in this paptr • ..., lbOH of th• autbon nd lrt •Ol lntndtd lo .-.,prrstnl tht 
offid1I position oflhr DoD, USAF, Tht Atrosp1ct Corpor11ion or uy othtr l0¥trnmul 11ucy. 
With the dccrcascd funding available for government programs, many agencies hne converged or an: contemplating converging 
theirfunctionsandpcrsonnclinordertobccostcffcctiveandmllll:cfficientintheirproccsscs 
This study provides an overview of the organizational theory related to convergence pllX:css and the issues and impacts of 
creating joint programs from independent, long standing military and civil programs. The management aspects of the convergence 
pllX:CSS, with an emphasis on human and organizational issues, an: presented and lessons learned highlighted. 
The methodology used to conduct this study included an extensive literature search and survey. The survey was completed by 
individuals at diffCTCnt levels of management selected from six converged and converging government programs. 
The results of the study revealed a strong tendency for converged government programs to violate basic organizational theory 
principlesduringtheirconvergcnceexpericnces. Survey results showed individualsinthescconvergedorganizationsgeneral ly had 
lowerthanaveragemorale,werephysicallyseparatedfromkeypansoftheorganization,faccdscriousbureaucraticroadblocks,and 
fcltthattherewasalackofcommunicationwithintheirorganizations. 
Finally,suggestionsforconductingsuccessfulconverged programsan:out!inedincluding:establishagreementonmissionneed 
and requirements as soon as possible; establish cleaJ chain of command; provide honest, direct and frequent communications; 
establish equitable management and procedures; aniculate a vision; and endeavor to bring all levels of workers together within a 
common set of goals. · 
QJlJEcrlYE 
The purpose of this study was to chart unexplored 
areas of organizational behavior relevant to current 
government program consolidation and to provide 
insight into the human side of converging government 
programs. 
The nation's tightening economic and fiscal re· 
alities have created an environment in which the gov· 
emment is being forced to cut more and do more with 
less. Initiatives such as Vice President Gore's National 
Performance Review have identified ways in which 
government activities and programs may be re·vamped 
to save money. The terms "downsizing," "right·sizing," 
and "streamlining" are becoming standard vocabulary 
for all government employees. 
As members of a Team associated with a con· 
verging program, the authors hoped to gain insight into 
the often overlooked organiz.ational aspects of bringing 
together dichotomous inter.agency organiz.ations. It is 
hoped that insight and lessons learned discovered in this 
research will be used to insurethefuturesuccessofthat 
program and other converging programs. 
=-= The tenn convergence as defined by Webster's 
New World Dictionary is: "the act, fact, or condition of 
converging; to move or be directed toward the same 
place,purposeorresult."(Rcf. l) 
It is ironic that organiz.ations who attempt to 
"converge," "merge," "acquire," "integrate," or 
"consolidate" seldom achieve their originally intended 
purpose or result. According to a decade·long study of 
ten mergers by Arthur Lewis, 80"/o failed to live up to 
projections made for them in the feasibi lity studies. 
(Rd.2) 
For the purposes of this study, the tenns quoted 
above are used synonymously. Converged organiz.ations 
are those brought together from previously different 
sources, now working toward a common goal. 
snmy METHOOO! ooy 
The study methodology includes the folJowing 
sevenphases:(l)literaturesearch;(2)surveydevelop--
ment; (3) survey panelists selection; (4) survey data ac· 
cumulation; (5) data analysis; (6) conclusions based on 
findings and literature search; (7) recommendations 
based on study conclusions. 
I !TERATIIRE SEARCH 
The first phase of the study was to gather data on 
converged/converging inter·agency programs from 
published literature. Due to the newness of the conver· 
gence activity in government the breadth and depth of 
available of data sources are limited. However, the 
literature is quite complete in the area of commercial 
mergers. 
Ocganjzatjonal Theory 
The intent of the managers of most converging 
organizations is to magically make "I+ I '* 3," hoping 
for a synergistic effect when two organizations combine 
talents, resources, and other strong-points for a more 
productive, efficient union. It seems logical, and often 
appears that "on paper~ this newly converged organiza-
tion would be stronger than its parts. However, it is 
generally agreed that a merger will not produce that 
elusive "synergy" sought by companies unless the issues 
involving people arc addressed. (Ref. 3) 
Financial, technological, and strategic consid-
erations are typically identified by top managers when a 
merger is being considered. These objective, tangible 
measures produce a type of~organizational bonom-linc~ 
on which managers make their decision, and judge the 
results of the convergence. However, even when the bot-
tom line looks favorable, mergers often fail. Problems 
with people are one reason why one-half to two--thirds of 
convergence efforts fail. (Ref. 3) The answer appears not 
to be with the bonom line, but at the front line with 
people. 
The literature suggests that there has been a re-
vival of interest in the role of human factors in deter-
mining the outcome of convergence. In a survey of more 
than 200 European chief executive officers, Booz, Allen 
& Hamilton Inc. found that the, "ability to integrate the 
new company'' was ranked as the top factor in dcter-
mining thesucccssofthemerger.(Rcf.4) 
The role of people, erroneously labeled the 
"soft" or "mushier'' issue, tends to be ignored 
or overlooked, perhaps not surprisingly, given 
thatthehumanresourcefunctionisoftenseen 
as marginal to the organization and is rarely 
involved in target selection or merger 
planning."(Ref. 5) 
Several algorithms exist for analyzing the finan-
cial compatibility of organizations, but the .question of 
assessing the human factors involved remains elusive. 
Mirvis and Marks suggest that along with the quantita-
tive assessments, managers must appraise "organization" 
and"cultural"fit. Organizational fit requires managers 
to weigh the following factors when considering 
convergence: (I) Compare the compatibility of 
structures, system, people, (2) Define key synergism, 
factors that "make it work," and (3) Develop scenarios 
based on different degrees of integration (i.e. total ab-
sorption, common functions). Cultural fit requires an 
assessment of: ( 1) Philosophy, methods, style, values, 
(2) Benefits versus Risks - compare integration models 
with potential costs such as resistance, turnover, prob-
lems, and (3) Make time an asset by using pre-conver-
gence period to test fit under different integration sce-
narios. (Ref. 6) 
Once the organizational and cultural fit of the 
converging organizations has been determined, and a 
decision to merge the organization has been made, 
... 
managers of newly converged organizations must deal 
with the largest stress factor on people, which is change. 
Managers Of organizations embarking on a sig-
nificant change event, such as a merger, must realize 
that their people will, according to training expert John 
lacovini, find themselves floundering in a sea of stress 
and confusion. "They look around for something to hold 
on to. They crave security, respect, and empathy even 
whilethebusinessofanorganizationalchangerusheson 
aroundthem."(Ref.7) 
As this organizational change occurs, the newly 
converged team may experience an "organizational 
sickness." Marks and Mirvis found some of the symp-
toms of this risky disease to be: turnover of key people, 
people refusing reassignment, relocation costs/ 
downtime, post merger performance drops, lost 
customcrs.lcapacity/synergism and finally morale prob-
lems. (Ref. 6) Organizations as a whole may experience 
some, or all of these symptoms, but for individuals in 
the organization, the consequences of the sickness may 
be grave. 
For individuals, a merger is analogous to the 
death of a loved one. Mourners go through phases of 
immediate disbelief and loss, they then often have 
trouble getting their lives back in gear, and finally they 
realize that life must go on. Iacovini suggests that 
merging organizations pass through similar phases on 
the road to convergence. First, individuals feel a collec-
tive loss for their former organization. They must let go 
of their old paradigm and deal with a new set of ru les 
that has not yet been well defined. Feelings of sadness, 
anger, denial, and fear are common during this phase. 
To leave this stage they must be provided with things 
like visible support, stability, opportunities to interact 
informally and a constant flow of information. They 
then move to the next phase known as the impasse 
where they may become entrenched in their old way of 
doing business, longing for the past. Successful organi-
zations take time to reflect on where things stand, en-
courage creative thinking and tolerate diversity and en-
courage people to reminisce about the past and think of 
ways to improve in the future. Finally, organizations that 
successfully navigate through the first two stages will 
reach the renewal stage characterized by new challenges 
and continuous improvement. (Ref. 7) 
Post-merger stress can start the newly combined 
organization on the road to disaster. In a case study ofa 
large optical product company, Marks and Mirvis ob-
served stressful feelings and rumor mongering, break-
down in communications and an "us versus them" 
mentality ran rampant. Conflicts over who should lead, 
stereotyping, and generally ill feelings dominated the 
environment (Ref. 8). To mitigate these stresses employ· 
ers must provide three basic needs: (I) Psychological 
enlistment to make people feel wanted and have an 
emotional stake in the mission of the team, (2) Role dC· 
velopment to get people excited about their new jobs 
and about the team's potential, and (3) Trust and confi-
dcncc development in people's colleagues and supervi-
sors. (Ref. 8) Once these needs are provided for, man-
agcmcn1 can begin the quest or reaching the new heights 
they had hoped to obtain when they first contemplated 
convergence. 
In conclusion, we find through an extensive 
searchorthcorganizationalthcory literature that human 
ractors may he a major conuibutor to the success or 
railurc or converging organizations. Top level leaders 
and managers must consider the organizational bonom 
line as well as the financial bonom line. Literature 
documents that, even before convergence occurs, man-
= The second phase or the study was to develop a 
survey in order to gather the necessary data from 
"experts." Experts arc defined as those individuals with 
current first-hand experience in a converged/converging 
in1e.r-agency government program. 
In order to idenlify cri1ical sub-areas of the con-
vergence process the authors interviewed participants 
(experts/management) in the converged organizations 
believed to have a comprehensive first-hand knowledge 
of convergence. The following key areas evolved: 
funding, political sensitivity, top-level government sup-
port, bureaucratic roadblocks, level of program success, 
level of top-down management, and organization mo-
rale. These areas were incorporated in the survey. 
A broad-based survey, based on the above listed 
key areas, was developed that contains a series or simple 
closed-end questions utilizing Likert scales, measuring 
anitudes,(Ref.9)as well as open-ended questions asking 
the respondents to identify and define what they 
considered to he the critical elements and issues of the 
government multi-agency convergence process. 
The respondents were asked to indicate their 
degree of agreement, based on ten point Likert scales, 
with the following eight simple closed-end questions: 
1. Categorize the level of success of the converged 
program that you work(ed) on. 
2. Describe yoor program's funding profile. (Mark all that 
apply). 
3. Characterize the converged organization's morale 
4. Describe the programs political sensitivity. 
5. Describe the bureaucratic roadblocks experienced. 
6 Describe the level of top-down direction received. 
7. Characterize the lead agency support fO< your 
program. 
8. Characterize the physical location of involved 
individuals/groups. 
The intent of the following two open-ended 
questions was to encourage the respondents to provide 
open, detailed opinions on the relevant subject. 
.... 
agement must assess the organizational and cultural fit 
or the organizations. Once compatibility has been dc-
tennincd, they then must be prepared to deal with the 
newly generated stress, confusion, controversy and 
problems or organizational sickness that organizations, 
and individuals within those organizations will be ex-
periencing as they pass through the phases or letting go 
of the old paradigm, gening stuck in the impasse, and 
finally renewing their commitment. To counter these 
difficulties,peoplc'snccdsforsccurity,respect,andem-
pathy must be met. Personnel must be psychologically 
cnlistcdintothcncworganization. 
1. If you were in charge of a converged program, what 
would yoo do lo ensure its sUoCCeas? 
2. Based on your experience, what advice would you 
give to a program that is being considered for 
convergence? 
~
Forthissurvey,25 expertswcrcsclec1cd in three 
primary ways. More than half of the respondents were 
known to the authors through a currenlly converging 
program. A smaller portion of the respondents were se-
lected for their current involvement in diverse, mature 
converged programs. Finally, some of the respondents 
were located through infonnal channels such as pre-
liminary research phone calls and referrals by other re-
spondents. 
The panelists represent three levels of organiza-
tional authority. The majority (sixteen) of the panelists 
are in middle management, top level managcmcn1 is 
represen1cd by two panelists, and seven workers arc in-
cluded in the panel. This predctcnnincd sample repre-
sents the current spectrum of inter-agency government 
convergence efforts. 
Suryey Response Rate 
or the 25 surveys scn1 to panelists in con-
verged/converging programs, 25 responses were re-
ceived. This unusual result of a I OOo/t return rate may be 
unprecedented. Anything over SO"!. return rate for a 
ques1ionnaire is considered acceptable. The high re-
sponse rate can be attributed to many factors, one of 
which could he a high level of interest in the subject 
area of convergence and its resultant success or failure. 
Another contributing factor to the response rate could be 
the desire to contribute to the understanding of a 
relatively undocumented and poorly undcrs1ood subject 
The respondents have the common attribute of 
current involvement in a converging/converged program 
and possibly have justified human factors concerns 
about job security. Research has shown that human 
factors aspcctsof"mergers" arc similar to those present 
in the program-convergence process. 
_,,__ 
The survey data are ordinal·scalcd and cannot be 
analyzed by the usual analysis of variance procedures. 
The data were analyzed instead for significance based 
on the sample population of three layers of management. 
The method of significance-analysis selected is the 
Kruskal-Wallis Test. (Ref. l l) This non-parametric test of 
significance is a one-way analysis of variance by ranks 
and requires only ordinal-level data. The null hypothesis 
assumed is: Management level does not affect 
responses. 
Figure I shows the scores, ranks and sum of 
ranks for the test scores. Those da{8. were incorporated 
into the test statistic used for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) 
tcstwith1hcrcsultantscorc(Ho)of3.956. 
H,·-" [~l.[~l.[~TI- l(N .. ) 
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It is known that the distribution of the Kruska\-Wallis 
test stat istic is very close to the chi-square distribution. 
With a conservative level of risk (0.10), the maximum 
test statistic is 4.606. The comparison shows that the 
survey data score fits within the chi-square distribu1ion; 
thus, the null hypothesis is correct. The responses from 
management are assumed therefore to be significant data 
and not biased. 
l'llill.lllilS 
Having determined the significance of all data, 
the information from management as well as workers 
was used to determine the following seven findings. 
Finding l:The respondents were uncertain about 
the level of success of their program. 
By a factor of two to one, uncertainty about level of 
program success prevailed. The large number of panelists 
who are currently working in a transitioning convergence 
program may have driven this finding. However, the state 
of the convergence program does not make this finding 
any less valid because uncertainty is one of the human 
resource problems considered pervasive in the 
merger/convergence process. It is well documented that 
people strongly identify their personal success with the 
success level of their programs or organizations. 
5-11 
Figure I Kruskal-Wallis Test Results 
Worker Mlddl• Top 
Respondents provided seventy-three comments on the 
survey, some of which are included in the discussion for 
each finding. 
Uncertainty in program success directly relates to 
personal insecurity. As documented by Bastien, this 
insecurity is no1 confined to executives and top managers, 
but pervades all organizational levels sampled. 
Uncertainty in terms of job (and income) security was not 
as common as the fear of diminished power, control, or 
influence (closely related to dead-end syndrome 
described by Kanter). (Ref. 12) Uncertainty in terms of job 
and income security may not have occurred due to the 
predominately military/civil service survey respondent 
population, who typica lly are not concerned with these 
issues. 
Level of Program SucceH 
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Respondents commented about the lack of pennanenl 
manning commitments by management early in the con-
Finding 2:The morale of the organizations was 
considered to be in -need of improve-
ment. 
The vast majority of the respondents felt tha1 the 
morale of their organization was less than OK. This 
finding correlates well with the uncertainty aboul level 
of program success. The above comments on uncer-
tainty apply equally to low morale issues. 
Respondents commen1ed about the lack of stTOng 
leadership during the organization's infancy. Military 
personnel, given their culiure and structure, thrive 
under able leadership and Jack effec1iveness in its 
absence. Morale is defini1ely affected. The Defense 
Systems Managemenl College (DSMC) is clear in their 
recommendation to provide strong and flexible 
leadership in conjunction with managing joint 
programs. (Ref. IS)"One of the major challenges for a 
joinJ program manager Is to develop an npriJ de 
corps willlln the program office," according to the 
DSMC. (Ref. IS) However, they also note that joint pro-
gram offices require more personnel than typical 
single-service programs due lo the greater need for 
coordination and interfaces with the various portici-
paling services. Unfortunately, respondents' comments 
also noted understaffing exacerbated by personnel 
night and other types of rum-over. 
.... 
verged program. fears of personal rejection as well as 
jobinsecurityarcdefinitedriversoflowmorale. 
The individual and social processes of coping with 
this uncertainty involve sudden swi,ches between 
opposites (fight- flight, 1;ommitment-rejeaion) rather 
than gradual change from one state to another. The 
aspect of personal uncertainty expressed as fear of the 
unknown alternates with expressions of resentment at the 
forced intrusion of convergence, shows the fight-flight 
reaction noted by Marks and Mirvis. (Rd. 13) The 
personal reactions to uncertainty are major contributing 
factors 10 the success or failure of mergers/convergence 
efforts.(Rer. 14) 
Additional respondents' comments included: "de-
converge; don't do it; jus1 say no" and "Don't converge, 
create a new agency." 
Morale of Organization 
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Additional respondents' comments included: 
"Staffing and facilities should be a firs1 priority;" 
"Motivate and provide enough freedom for people to 
be creative;" and "Team building and cultural accli· 
ma1ionprocessesarecrucial." 
Finding 3:Tbe converged organizations were per-
ceived as permeated with bureaucratic 
roadblocks and characterized as al-
most total bottlenec:ks and constricted. 
Bureaucratic roadblocks were characterized as 
"almost total bottlenecks" and "constricted" by almost 
90% of the respondents. The agencies were perceived 
ashaving"separateagendas"and"dividedloyalties." 
DSMC Lessons Learned included the following 
four statements: 
Personnel participating in joint programs have 
divided loyalties - to the joint program and to 
their service affiliations. 
Differences in which the Services view the joint 
program, such as involvement or priority, can 
impact the joint program (separate agendas). 
Obtaining a joint agreement on the mission need 
and doctrinal requirements is one of the most 
difficult tasks in a joint program effort. 
Finding 4:The direction provided by the top-
most levels of management for the 
converged organizations was not 
considered to be at an ideal level. The 
absence of direction was predominant. 
Almost half of all respondents found that they had 
" hardly any" top-level direction while approximately 
one-third cited an ideal level. Comments included; 
"establish clear authority of top management at the 
beginning," "minimize top management," and 
"establish program's hierarchy first, then .define the 
system." 
Low morale is reflected in one respondent's 
statement that "any" direction would be better than 
none. A perception of strong leadership that has a 
focus on team-building is critical for a successful joint 
program. 
Findings I, 2, 3, and 4 appear to be linked. Lack of 
direction and poor communication contribute to 
uncertainty about a program's level of success. 
The level of communicating and "forcing percep-
tions and misperceptions to the surface at the earliest 
opportunity in order to bring about collaborative 
problem-solving will determine the relative success of 
the union both from a human resources and uhi-
mately, financial standpoint," according to Arnold. 
(Rcf. 16) 
The literature has total agreement that lack of di-
rection for an organization with strong infrastructure 
will eventually produce failure. But the effects on a 
S-13 
Bureaucratic Roadblocks 
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Agreement by the Servicesonthepriorityoftheir 
listed requirements is one of the most difficult to 
achieve. (Ref. IS) 
Several respondents commented that "politics is in 
the driver's seat." 
Amount of Top-level Direction 
start-up organiz.ation can be devastating. Clear, well-
defined reporting relationships and lines of authority 
should be established as soon as possible. Historically, 
the most unsuccessful mergers have suffered from 
unclear relationships. They also have a tendency to 
overcorrect the problem and change already vague, 
poorly defined reporting relationships several times 
duringthefirstyear.(Rcf.17) 
Finding 5:Program funding was adequately 
funded in approximately half the cases 
and under funded or with a recover-
able shortfall in the rest. 
Approximately 40% of respondents cited that their 
programs were on-target with their funding profile with 
about 25% reporting an under-funded status. 
The program funding docs not appear to correlate 
with the other findings of this study. Although under-
funding could be considered a strcssor, given the cur-
renl budgetary restrictions in the defense industry, 
shortfalls seem to have become an accepted fact of the 
aerospace industry life. 
Perhaps the respondents recognize that joint pro-
gram funding is tenuous at best. "Few joint programs 
enjoy single-source funding ... funding is provided by 
the services, subject to each service's assessment of its 
own funding priorities" as is pointed out by the DSMC. 
(Ref.IS) 
Finding 6:All programs suneyed were consider-
ed controversial. 
Program Sensitivity 
Finding 7:The level of Lead Agency support var-
ies consistently across programs from 
"almost none" to the "highett level of 
support." 
Approximately 30"/o responded with "adequate" sup-
port being provided by the Lead Agency; 25% reported 
"highest" support, and the remaining 25% reported 
"lukewarm" support. Approximately 20% cited "almost 
none." 
The level of Lead Agency support docs not correlate to 
Findings I, 2, 3, and 4. It appears that this docs not have a 
noticcableimpactonhumanresourceissues. 
..,. 
Funding 
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All respondents classified their programs as contro-
versial: approximately 60% classified the program sensi· 
tivity as "highly" controversial while the remaining 40% 
were"somewhat"controversial. 
The level of program sensitivity docs not appear to 
correlate to findings I, 2, 3, and 4. Perhaps, as is the case 
with finding S, the pervasiveness of program sensitivity 
docsnotactasadiscriminator. 
~ 
The findingsareclearthathumanresource issues 
are perceived as problematic in the process of converg-
ing inter-agency government programs. High areas of 
stress were determined to be in the areas of program 
uncertainty, morale of the organization, bureaucratic 
roadblocks, and direction provided by top-most levels of 
management. All areas listed are widely recognized in 
the literature for their negative impacts on the success 
prospects of merging organizations. Only recently have 
researchers begun to study the impact on employees, an 
issue many argue is critical in determining the success 
orfailurcofconvergence.(Ref.18) 
Distance between functioning parts of the or-
ganization was the subject of one ofthe questions in the 
survey. Over 60% required air travel to see their coun-
1erpans. It could be said that distance does make the 
convergence process a lot more difficult. It means 
harder work is required on the communica1ions. 
People problems arc cited as the reason why onc-
half to two-thirds of organizational convergences ulti-
mately fail. (Ref. 3) The combination of uncertainty about 
program status, delayed pcnnancnt staffing, uncon-
vcrged staffs, and lack of clear direction from top-level 
management shown in this study affect people's morale 
and productivity. 
Stress reduction training helped employees cope 
during the transition period of convergence. (Ref. 19) 
Similarly, employees adjusted better to convergence and 
decreased their uncertainty (insecurity) when they 
received realistic communications throughout the 
proccss.(Ref.14)(Ref.20) 
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During initial convergence activities, "every 
policy and procedure is up for grabs." Mergers and ac-
quisitions can cause depression, uncertainty, loss of 
control and job insecurity. (Ref. 18) Experienced corpo-
rate observers csli.rnatc that it takes two to three years 
for the ttawna of an acquisition or merger to subside. In 
many cases, ~normaJcyM never returns. (Ref. 3) 
Job characteristics and attitudes toward co-
workers (peers and supervisors) are two primary 
dctcnninants of overall employee attitudes towards 
organizational commitment and satisfaction. (Ref. 18) 
Employees need the following: 
l .cle1rperceplionthatsomeoneisinch1rge 
2.~bcingmanagedin•forcefuluidfllirmanncr 
) . open,honestwmmunicationsabouthowtheprocesswiUunfold 
4. dear i;ommuniattion of 111)1 chuiges in the reward structure. 
(Rd'll) 
One highly successful organization actually 
gathered employees together to hold a ceremony at 
which they eulogized an old program they were phasing 
out, and then offered a champagne toast to a new start-
up venture. (Ref.)) 
In conclusion, it has been suggested tha1 the 
greatest sins of post-merger management are sins of 
omission. In opting to do nothing in an cffon to avoid 
doing something wrong, critical mistakes are made. 
(Ref.17) 
The reader should consider the limitations of this 
survey lie in the survey panicipant population. Funhcr 
research is required to dctcnninc if expanding the ,small 
sample size, and varying the government respondent 
population would produce different results. 
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